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L Introduction: Employment Division v. Smith and the Demise of the
Compelling Interest/Least Restrictive Means Test
To the casual observer, peyote is unremarkable even as a plant. "A
species of small, spineless cactus found in a limited growth area, principally
in present-day Mexico and the State of Texas,"' it would not appear to have
the power to inspire a conversation over coffee, much less a constitutional
debate. Similarly, the billions of grapes that fill vineyards or the ears of
wheat that wave in countless fields throughout the world would not, in
themselves, generate much excitement.
However, when those grapes become wine and that wheat becomes
bread, and when a priest raises that bread and wine in front of an assembly
of believers and echoes the words of Jesus, "Make this, all of you, and eat
it: this is my Body... take this, all of you, and drink from it: this is the
cup of my blood ..... ,' they are far from ordinary for those who are
gathered. In the same way, when the buttons harvested from the tops of
peyote plants are dried and ceremonially smoked during a time of prayer
*Pastor, St. Benedict the Moor Church, Milwaukee, Wis. B.A., 1984, University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee; M.Div., 1993, Catholic Theological Union, Chicago; J.D., 2000,
Georgetown University Law Center. The author wishes to thank Professor Reid Chambers and
the participants in the Federal Indian Law Seminar at GULC, Fall 1999, for their valuable
comments and questions.
1. ARLENE HIRSCIVELDER & PAUL=Trr MOuN, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NA vE AMERICAN
REIUGIONS 213 (1992).
2. EUCHARISnC PRAYER II, THE SACRAMENTARY (ROMAN MtssAL) 549 (Catholic Book
Publishing Co. 1985).
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and song for another group of believers, peyote itself becomes a sacrament,
"a means of divine grace ... a sign or symbol of a spiritual reality."3 In
the Native American Church and among various tribes in North America,
such peyote ceremonies are as sacred and ritualized as the Roman Catholic
celebration of the Eucharist, even in its most ancient forms:
The modem peyote ceremony is an all-night meeting in which
participants sit inside a tipi or other structure facing a fire and
a crescent-shaped altar. The ceremony consists basically of four
parts: praying, singing, eating peyote, and quietly
contemplating. Usually those who are present participate in all
parts of the long and tiring ceremony, but it seems that most of
the time an individual just sits quietly looking at the fire and the
"father peyote" - and contemplating it. It is, however, a
collective rite, and although in a sense the individuals are
isolated from the other members in their own thoughts and
prayers, they quickly respond when it is their turn to sing or
drum. The prayers, songs, and quiet contemplation, coupled
with the effects of peyote, frequently lead to personal
revelations.4
The records of the apostles or writings of the prophets are
read for as long as time allows. Then, when the reader has
finished, the president in a discourse admonishes [us] to imitate
these good things. Then we all stand up together and offer
prayers; and as we said before, when we have finished praying,
bread and wine and water are brought up, the president likewise
offers prayers and thanksgivings to the best of his ability, and
the people assent, saying the amen; and there is a distribution,
and everyone participates in [the elements] over which thanks
have been given; and they are sent through the deacons to those
who are not present.5
Most people would be shocked if a priest and his parishioners celebrating
an open air mass in Washington, D.C. were arrested and prosecuted for
violating the district statute which prohibits the drinking of alcoholic
beverages in public places6 because they served and consumed wine, a
3. MERRIAM WEBsTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1029 (10th ed. 1997).
4. EDWARD F. ANDERSON, PEYOTE: Tim DINE CACTUS 49 (2d ed. 1996).
5. ST. JUSTIN MARTYR, FIRST APOLOGY 67.3-5 (n.d.) (Ronald C.D. Jasper & Geoffrey J.
Cuning, trans.), quoted in EDWARD FOLEY, FROM AGE TO AGE 27 (1991).
6. D.C. STAT. ANN. § 25-128(aXI) (1999). The statute states, in part, "No person in the
District of Columbiashall drink or possess, in an opened container, any alcoholic beverage in any
of the following places .... In any street, alley, park, or parking." Id. Violators can be
imprisoned for up to 90 days andlor fined $100. See id. § 25-128(e).
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routine practice in any Catholic Church in which people receive communion
from the cup as well as from the paten or ciborium. When the Supreme
Court of the United States issued its ruling in Employment Division v.
Smith" ten years ago, however, there was some fear - implied in the
dissent of one justice9 - that such actions were possible in light of the
Court's decision to uphold the State of Oregon's denial of unemployment
compensation benefits to two privately employed substance abuse counselors
for violating state criminal law by their use of peyote in rituals of the
Native American Church.
In Smith, the Court held the state's passage and enforcement of a neutral
law of general applicability, which incidentally burdened the respondents'
ability to practice their religion, did not violate their rights under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment."0 In addition to a vigorous
concurrence" and dissent,'2 there was an outcry by constitutional
scholars 3 and advocates for Native Americans' religious freedom.'4
Critics of Smith, and even members of the Court who concurred in the
judgment, asserted that the Court was abandoning the "compelling interest"
test adopted in Sherbert v. Verner,5 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 6 and other Free
7. The paten and ciborium axe vessels used in the Roman Catholic liturgy to hold the
eucharistic bread.
8. Employment Div., Dept of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
9. ld. at 914 n.6. In this footnote of his dissent, Justice Blackmun noted:
In this respect, respondents' use of peyote seems closely analogous to the
sacramental use of wine by the Roman Catholic Church. During prohibition, the
federal government exempted such use of wine from its general ban on possession
and use of alcohol . . . . However compelling the government's then general
interest in prohibiting the use of alcohol may have been, it could not plausibly
have asserted an interest sufficiently compelling to outweigh Catholics' right to
take communion.
10. See id. at 878-79.
11. See id. at 891-907 (J. O'Connor, concurring in the judgment). "In my view, today's
holding dramatically departs from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence, appears
unnecessary to resolve the question presented, and is incompatible with our nation's fundamental
commitment to individual religious liberty." Id. at 891.
12. See iL at 907-21 (J. Blacknun, dissenting). "[The court's holding] effectuates a
wholesale overturning of settled law concerning the religion clauses of our constitution." Id. at
908.
13. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Rise and Decline of the Constitutional Protection of
Religious Liberty, 70 No_. L. REV. 651 (1991); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free
Exercise, 1990 SuP. Cr. REV. 1, cited in DAVID GrCHES Er AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 778
(1998).
14. See, e.g., John Rhodes, An American Tradition: The Religious Persecution of Native
Americans, 52 MoNT. L. RE,. 13 (1991).
15. See 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that state violated the right to free exercise of
petitioner, a Seventh-Day Adventist, when it denied her unemployment compensation after she
was terminated from her job and was unable to obtain other employment because of her refusal
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2000
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Exercise cases. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor, while acknowledging
that the right to free exercise is not absolute, maintained that "[w]e have
respected both the First Amendment's express textual mandate and the
governmental interest in regulation of conduct by requiring the government
to justify any substantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by a
compelling state interest and by means narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest."17 Justice Scalia, however, contended in the opinion of the Court
that the "compelling interest" test was not being abandoned but merely
restricted."5
While the outcome in Smith surprised many, it was not unforeseeable
given the Court's decisions in several other Free Exercise cases over the
previous five years. Like Smith, two of these cases involved American
Indian"1 religious beliefs and practices. In Bowen v. Roy,' the Court
upheld the right of federal government to insist that recipients of welfare
and food stamp benefits be identified by social security numbers, despite the
insistence of an Abenaki father that compliance with the requirement would
rob his child's spirit.
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n," the Court
upheld the right of the federal government to permit construction of a road
and harvesting of timber on a portion national forest land that had long been
used for religious purposes by members of three tribes. While the Court
conceded that allowing such activities would have a destructive effect on
the ability of the Indians to practice their religion, the Court maintained that
its jurisprudential hands were tied:
The Constitution simply does not provide a principle that could
justify upholding respondents' legal claims. However much we
might wish that it were otherwise, government simply could not
operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious
needs and desires .... The First Amendment must apply to all
to work on Saturday, the Adventist sabbath, where the state failed to establish a compelling
interest to justify the policy).
16. See 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that state compulsory education law requiring children
to attend school until age 16 violated the Free Exercise and substantive Due Process rights of
respondent, a member of the Old Order Amish sect, where the state could not show a compelling
interest in keeping children in school beyond the eighth grade level permitted by the Amish).
17. Smith, 494 U.S. at 894.
18. 1I at 883 ("We have never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the
Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment compensation.")
19. Throughout this article, the terms "Native American" and "Indian" will be used
interchangeably and will refer to those American citizens who descend from the indigenous
peoples of this hemisphere and who may or may not he members of federally recognized tribes,
bands, clans or similar groups.
20. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
21. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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citizens alike, and it can give to none of them a veto over public
programs that do not prohibit the free exercise of religion. The
Constitution does not, and the courts cannot, offer to reconcile
the various competing demands on government, many of them
rooted in sincere religious belief, that inevitably arise in so
diverse a society as ours. That task, to the extent that it is
feasible, is left for the legislatures and other institutions.'
In the five years leading up to Smith, the Court also rejected the Free
Exercise claims of a Jewish military chaplain disciplined for wearing a
yarmulke in violation of the uniform dress codeP and Muslim prisoners
who were prevented by prison work regulations from participating in
religious services on Fridays (the Islamic sabbath).' Taken together, the
Court's holdings in these cases represented an increasing deference to the
power of governments to enact neutral laws or regulations of general
applicability that had the effect of burdening, and possibly even crippling,
the abilities of religious minorities to freely practice their faiths.
Although Smith represented more of an evolutionary rather than a
revolutionary step in Free Exercise jurisprudence - indeed, its core
principle of permitting a neutral law of general applicability to "trump" a
Free Exercise claim was over a century old' - it occasioned a broad
wave of criticism that included legal scholars and "such unlikely allies as
the National Association of Evangelicals, the Mormon Church, and the
American Civil Liberties Union."'  What troubled many, particularly
advocates for minority religions, was the Court's reliance on the political
process to equitably address their Free Exercise claims.27 Henrietta Mann,
a Cheyenne and professor of Native American studies at the University of
Montana, lamented the decision as an injustice that would fall most heavily
on American Indians, who had historically served as the proverbial canary
22. Id. at 452.
23. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
24. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
25. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (upholding conviction of Mormon
petitioner for violating federal ban on polygamous marriage over his Free Exercise claim, where
congressional authority to pass laws of general application regulating religiously motivated
conduct, as opposed to religious belief, was not limited by the First Amendment).
26. STEVEN GOLDBERG, SEDUCED BY SCIENCE: How A MEUcAN RELIGION HAS LOST ITs
WAY 79 (1999).
27. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
In his opinion for the court, Justice Scalia noted:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place
at relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in;
but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to
a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh
the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2000
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in the coal mine, warning the nation when the civil rights of minority
groups were imperiled.'
I. A Congressional Response to Smith: The Rise and Fall of the
Religious Liberly Restoration Act
In an attempt to address these concerns, Congress passed and President
Clinton signed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).
The primary purpose of RFRA was to revive the Sherbert and Yoder
compelling interest/least restrictive means test as the standard for evaluating
Free Exercise claims against neutral laws of general applicability." In
addition, it gave plaintiffs a specific cause of action to pursue claims against
federal, state and local governments and their officials."
Less than four years after it was enacted, however, the use of RFRA to
challenge the actions of state and local governments was declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States in City of
Boerne v. Flores.' The plaintiff in this case, the archbishop of San
Antonio, Texas, had used the statute to challenge the actions of a local
zoning board pursuant to a historical preservation ordinance that denied a
Roman Catholic parish the permits needed to expand the church to
accommodate a growing number of members. The Court held that RFRA
violated basic constitutional principles of separation of powers and
federalism. 3
The Court found that Congress, in relying on the enforcement provision
in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as the underlying authority for
RFRA, violated separation of powers. The Court held that congressional
power under the Fourteenth Amendment was remedial and not
substantive?5 "Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise
28. See Minority Religious Practices: Where Does the State Draw the Line? 14, 16
(Symposium, "Religious Liberty in America: Crossroads or Crisis?," Mar. 16-17, 1993, Arlington,
Va.).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
30. See id § 2000bb-l(b) ("Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person - (1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.").
31. See id § 2000bb-l(c) (providing for judicial relief for those whose Free Exercise rights
have been burdened in violation of the statute, as well as standing pursuant to the general rules
of standing under U.S. CONsr. art. Il); id. § 2000b-2(1) (defining "government" to include "a
branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of
law) of the united states, a state, or a subdivision of a state").
32. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
33. Id. at 534-36.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. xiv, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.").
35. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527 ("Any suggestion that Congress has a substantive, non-remedial
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Clause," the Court maintained, "cannot be said to be enforcing the clause.
Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right
is. It has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine
what constitutes a constitutional violation."'
In addition, the Court found that requiring a state to meet the compelling
interest/least restrictive means test, what it termed "the most demanding test
known to constitutional law," represented "a considerable congressional
intrusion into the states' traditional prerogatives and general authority to
regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens." '37 The Court found
that the sweeping scope of RFRA far exceeded the constitutional violations
it purported to remedy, not merely restoring but expanding the pre-Smith
status quo by imposing the least restrictive means on governmental actions
that even incidentally burden the exercise of religious beliefs.3
Ill. RFRA Resurrected? - The Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999
Less than two years after Boerne, there was a renewed congressional
attempt to statutorily restore the compelling interest/least restrictive means
test. After an initial effort during the 105th Congress passed the House
Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the Constitution but failed to
advance further, Rep. Charles Canady (R.-Fla.) introduced House Bill 1691,
the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999 (RLPA, or the Bill) in the
early months of the 106th session. 9 Within two months, the Bill passed
the House of Representatives by an overwhelming margin, 306-118.' The
Bill is currently before the Senate."'
The core purpose of RLPA was identical to that of RFRA: to restore the
compelling interest/least restrictive means test as the standard for assessing
the permissibility of governmental programs and activities, even those of
general applicability that substantially burden a person's free exercise of
religion.4' It attempted to do this, however, in ways that were intended to
power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by our case law.").
36. Id. at 519.
37. Ua. at 534.
38. Md. at 534-35.
39. H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 4 (1999).
40. See CONG. REC. H5608 (July 15, 1999).
41. S. 2081 (introduced Feb. 22, 2000).
42. See H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. § 2(b) (1999) ("A government may substantially burden a
person's religious exercise if the government demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person - (I) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest."); see also H.R. REP. No.
106-219, at 13 ("While the means used by [RLPA] are different from those used by RFRA, the
ends of each act are the same: to restore the requirement that courts examine substantial
government burdens on the exercise of religion to determine whether the offending state action
is the 'least restrictive' means of furthering a 'compelling' governmental interest.").
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2000
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avoid the defects that caused RFRA to be held unconstitutional in Boerne.
Interestingly, it also continued to rely on a congressional power that the
Court in Boerne explicitly found insufficient to enable RFRA to withstand
constitutional scrutiny.
The bill broadly defined "religious exercise" as
any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central
to a system of religious belief, and includes (a) the use,
building, or conversion of real property by a person or entity
intending that property for religious exercise; and (b) any
conduct protected as exercise of religion under the First
Amendment to the Constitution 3
In its effort to restore the Sherbert test, RLPA explicitly relied on two
established sources of congressional authority, the "power of the purse" and
the authority to regulate various forms of commerce. First, it declared that,
unless a government met the compelling interest/least restrictive standard
by carrying its evidentiary burden and the burden of persuasion" (after
claimants establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination), 5 it
cannot "substantially burden a person's religious exercise - (1) in a
program or activity, operated by the government, that receives federal
financial assistance . . . ."4 Second, it required application of the same
standard "in any case in which the substantial burden on the person's
religious exercise affects, or in which a removal of that substantial burden
would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several states, or
with Indian tribes."'7
In their report, the Bill's proponents on the House Judiciary Committee
suggested that RLPA's reliance on congressional powers under the
Commerce Clause was primarily intended to provide the "jurisdictional
element" required to sustain any cause of action pursuant to it." They
conceded that religious exercise was not itself commerce but asserted that
many aspects of that exercise implicated commerce!"
43. Id. § 8(1).
44. See id § 8(5) (defining "demonstrates" as meeting "the burdens of going forward with
the evidence and of persuasion").
45. H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 24.
46. Id. § 2(a)(1).
47. Id § 2(a)(2); see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
48. H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 28 ("Section 2(a)(2) applies the general rule to cases in which
the substantial burden affects commerce, or removal of the burden would affect commerce. This
so-called jurisdictional element must be proved in each case as an element of the cause of
action.").
49. Id. ("This subsection does not treat religious exercise itself as commerce, but it
recognizes that the exercise of religion sometimes requires commercial transactions, such as the
construction of churches, the hiring of employees, or the purchase of supplies and equipment.
[Vol. 25
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Another way in which RLPA attempted to directly address the
constitutional deficiencies in RFRA cited by the Court in Boerne was
through a subsection5' that specifically addresses the issue of land use
regulation and burdens on Free Exercise that was featured in that case."
As an initial matter, the Bill broadly defined "land use regulation."' In
response to what the house judiciary committee, citing numerous cases,
perceived to be a widespread problem of discrimination, RLPA's land use
provisions included:
(1) a requirement that a government apply the compelling interest/least
restrictive means test to any instance in which governmental authorities
apply or implement a (system of) regulation(s) or exemption(s) involving
individualized assessments that substantially burdens Free Exercise;'
(2) a prohibition against various forms of religious discrimination in land
use regulations;5 and
(3) the use of full faith and credit and preemption to maximize claimants'
opportunities to make and sustain successful challenges to the decisions of
land use regulators on Free Exercise grounds. '
Where the burden or removal of the burden on religious exercise affects one of these commercial
transactions, the act applies.").
50. see H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. § 3(b) (1999); see also id. § 8(3) (defining "land use
regulation").
51. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997).
52. See H.R. 1691 § 8(3) (defining "land use regulation" as "a law or decision by a
government that limits or restricts a private person's uses or development of land, or of structures
affixed to land, where the law or decision applies to one or more particular parcels of land or to
land within one or more designated geographical zones, and where the private person has an
ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other property interest in the regulated land, or a
contract or option to acquire such an interest.").
53. See generally H.R. REp. No. 106-219, at 18-24 (noting that land use regulation and the
discretionary power of local authorities have often frustrated the efforts of religious communities
to establish or further develop their places of worship).
54. See H.R. 1691 § 3(b)(1XA) ("Where, in applying or implementing any land use
regulation or exemption, or system of land use regulations or exemptions, a government has the
authority to make individualized assessment of the proposed uses to which real property would
be put, the government may not impose a substantial burden on a person's religious exercise,
unless the government demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is in furtherance
of compelling interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.").
55. See id. § 3(b)(l)(B), (C), (D) ("(B) No government shall impose or implement a land use
regulation in a manner that does not treat religious assemblies or institutions on equal terms with
nonreligious assemblies or institutions. (C) No government shall impose or implement a land use
regulation that discriminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of religion or
religious denomination. (D) No government with zoning authority shall unreasonably exclude
from the jurisdiction over which it has authority, or unreasonably limit within that jurisdiction,
assemblies or institutions principally devoted to religious exercise.").
56. See i. § 3(b)(2), (3) ("(2) Adjudication of a claim of a violation of the Free Exercise
Clause of this subsection in a non-federal forum shall be entitled to full faith and credit in a
federal court only if the claimant had a full and fair adjudication of that claim in the non-federal
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2000
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RLPA provided those asserting Free Exercise claims with a cause of
action and defense, as well as ability to make claims for attorneys fees."
It limited such claims by prisoners,"8 but gave the federal government
authority to sue to enforce compliance.59 In addition, the Bill contained
terms that: reiterated the existing prohibition against governmental burdens
on religious belief; expressly denied Free Exercise claims under RLPA
against religious organizations;6t  maintained neutrality regarding
governmental funding of religious organizations or activities and the
application of existing law regarding the permissibility of conditions on the
receipt of such funding;but acknowledged that compliance with RLPA
may require governmental expenditures.'
A subsection of the Bill gave governments the ability to "avoid the
preemptive force" of any of its provisions by: (1) changing a policy that
substantially burdens Free Exercise; (2) providing a religious exemption to
that policy; or (3) "any other means that eliminates the substantial
burden."" Another subsection required that RLPA "be construed in favor
of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted
by its terms and the Constitution."'
In light of RFRA's invalidation in Boerne, RLPA's drafters included a
severability provision that, in the event of another adverse constitutional
adjudication, would have allowed the surviving provisions to remain in
force.' They also included a section that explicitly denied application of
RLPA to any interpretation or construction of the other prong of the First
Amendment's guarantee of religious liberty, the Establishment Clause6
In sum, the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, relying on broad
congressional authority under the Commerce and Spending Clauses of the
forum. (3) Nothing in this subsection shall preempt State law that is equally or more protective
of religious exercise.").
57. See id. § 4(a) (cause of action); id. § 4(b) (attorney's fees).
58. See id § 4(c) (subjecting RLPA suits by prisoners to the limiting provisions of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e, as amended).
59. See id. § 4(d) (permitting the united states to sue for injunctive or declaratory relief to
enforce compliance with the act).
60. See id. § 5(a).
61. See id. § 5(b).
62. See id § 5(c)-(d).
63. See id. § 5(c).
64. I § 5(e).
65. Id § 5(g).
66. See id. § 5(h) ("If any provision of this Act or of an amendment made by this Act, or
any application of such provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional,
the remainder of this Act, the amendments made by this Act, and the application of the provision
to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected.").
67. See id § 6 ("Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect, interpret, or in any way
address that portion of the first amendment to the Constitution prohibiting laws respecting an
establishment of religion (referred to in this section as the 'Establishment Clause'.").
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Constitution, attempted to raise RFRA and, more critically, the compelling
interest/least restrictive means test, from constitutional death. It promises
to provide those who wished to attack governmental actions or any program
or activity receiving federal funds on Free Exercise grounds, particularly
those who wished to attack land use regulations, with a statutory cause of
action and the ability to obtain the legal assistance necessary to press their
claims.
IV. The Dubious Future of RLPA: Prospects and Problems
Had it ever become law, however, RLPA was likely to meet the same
fate as its predecessor, RFRA. Like RFRA, it suffered from serious
constitutional defects that are likely to cause it to be invalidated by the
Supreme Court. In addition, while RLPA's attempts to specifically attack
the problem of land use regulation were well intended, it remains possible
to address the same problems under existing law. As such, it was not a
very promising staff on which Free Exercise claimants, including and
especially Native Americans, can lean for vindication.
Unlike its predecessor, RLPA relied on an additional constitutional
authority which, like the Fourteenth Amendment," has at times been
interpreted broadly by the Court: the Commerce Clause.' For roughly
half of this century, the Court permitted Congress to rely on the Commerce
Clause to create legislation governing a fairly wide swath of American life,
including the wages and hours of workers,70 the production of farmers,'
the regulation of strip mining, and equal access to public
accommodations."
Like the application of RFRA at issue in Boerne, the application of
RLPA, with its identical and sweeping imposition of what the Court in
68. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,517-18 (1997) (noting the broad, though not
unlimited, powers Congress has under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to pass laws
enforcing constitutional rights, even where it may intrude in areas of legislation previously
reserved to the states).
69. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting congress the power, inter alia, "to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
70. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding minimum wage and
maximum hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938).
71. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. I11 (1942) (upholding provisions of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act which penalized respondent for exceeding production quota set by the
Department of Agriculture).
72. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)
(upholding, under a rational basis standard, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977 and congressional authority to regulate activities on private lands within state borders).
73. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding provisions
in title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 banning discrimination based on "race, color, religion,
or national origin" in public accommodations).
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Boerne termed "the most demanding test known to constitutional law"'
would have raised significant federalism concerns. This is not a matter of
little concern for Native Americans. While Boerne left RFRA's application
to the actions of the federal government intact (e.g., on a reservation or on
lands that are managed by the National Forest Service), it should be
recalled that roughly half of the Native Americans in the United States do
not live on or near a reservation." Like other citizens, this group is
subject to the jurisdictions of the state and local governments where they
reside.
The consequences of imposing a strict scrutiny standard of review and
a compelling interest/least restrictive means test on the acts of states and
their subsidiary units of government would, the Court in Boerne asserted,
have far-reaching and debilitating effects on federalism:
Laws valid under Smith would fall under RFRA without regard
to whether they had the object of stifling or punishing free
exercise.. . . Even assuming RFRA would be interpreted in
effect to mandate some lesser test, say, one equivalent to
intermediate scrutiny, the statute nevertheless would require
searching judicial scrutiny of state law with the attendant
likelihood of invalidation. This is a considerable intrusion into
the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to
regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens.76
In more recent cases such as New York v. United States' and Printz v.
United States,"x the Court has shown an increased willingness to proscribe
the extent to which Congress can compel state enforcement of federal
regulatory laws. In New York, the Court held that the "take title" provision
of the low-level radioactive policy amendments act exceeded congressional
powers under the Spending and Commerce Clauses (the same authorities
on which Congress relied in RLPA) where they had the effect of coercing
the states to choose between "either accepting ownership of waste or
regulating according to the instructions of congress," both of which
compelled the state to "regulate according to one federal instruction," thus
"infringing upon the core of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth
Amendment." 9
Printz involved a challenge to provisions of the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act that required state chief law enforcement officers
74. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997).
75. GIcHEs Er AL, supra note 13.
76. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534.
77. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
78. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
79. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 174-77.
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to conduct criminal background checks on prospective handgun
purchasers.'0 In holding that the provisions violated the Tenth
Amendment, the Court found that the act had the effect of conscripting
state officers to administer a federal regulatory program and concluded:
We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States
to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we
hold that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by
conscripting the States' officers directly. The Federal
Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to
address particular problems, nor command that the States'
officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer
or enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether
policy-making is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the
burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are
fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of
dual sovereignty."
It is hard to imagine that the Court would be much more enthusiastic
about a federal law that intentionally intruded on a traditional area of state
and local authority such as land use regulation by imposing a level of
constitutional scrutiny that the Court itself has already stated is
unnecessary if those regulations are generally applicable, facially neutral
regarding religion, and rationally related to a legitimate governmental
purpose."2 Indeed, a defining element of the Rehnquist Court's
jurisprudence, most recently demonstrated in United States v. Morrison,"3
has been its vigilance in proscribing the limits of congressional authority
to legislate and regulate in areas it considers more properly left to the
states."
80. Printz, 521 U.S. at 902.
81. 1l at 935.
82. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535 ("It is a reality of the modem regulatory state that numerous
state laws, such as the zoning regulations at issue here, impose a substantial burden on a large
class of individuals. When the exercise of religion has been burdened in an incidental way by
a law of general application, it does not follow that the persons affected have been burdened any
more than other citizens, let alone burdened because of their religious beliefs.").
83. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (upholding dismissal of petitioner Brzonkala's claims under the
Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981, against petitioners who allegedly raped her,
and holding that the act, which provided a federal civil remedy for gender-motivated violence,
was an unconstitutional use of congressional authority under both the commerce clause (for
failure to establish that gender-motivated violence had a sufficiently substantial effect on interstate
commerce) and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment (because it was not directed at remedying
discriminatory conduct by the state or state actors)).
84. See generally Steve France, Laying the Groundwork A.B.A. J., May 2000, at 40,40-42.
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RLPA's reliance on congressional authority under the spending clause"
was also problematic. Under the Court's holding in South Dakota v.
Dole,' Congress can attach conditions to the receipt of federal funds by
states, as long as those conditions are: (1) "in pursuit of the general
welfare;" (2) imposed and stated "unambiguously;" (3) related "to the
federal interest in particular national projects or programs;" and (4) not
independently barred by "other constitutional provisions.""
Curiously, while RLPA explicitly applied to any governmental program
or activity that received federal funding or where a burden on Free
Exercise or its removal affects Commerce" - thus fulfilling the second
Dole condition - it clearly stated: "Nothing in this section shall be
construed to authorize the United States to deny or withhold Federal
financial assistance as a remedy for a violation of this act."" Further,
RLPA's rules of construction did not allow any of its provisions to
"authorize a government to regulate or affect, directly or indirectly, the
activities or policies of a person other than a government as a condition of
receiving funding or other assistance."' Consequently, it appeared to
simultaneously proffer a Dole rationale and then render it irrelevant.
Even if RLPA's federal funding exceptions had not swallowed its rule,
its Spending Clause authority would have failed to meet the fourth prong
of the Dole standard. The Bill suffered from the same fundamental
separation of powers problem that afflicted RFRA. Its primary purpose
was to statutorily prescribe not merely the enforcement but the substance
of a constitutional right. As if they could not take the Supreme Court's
"no" in Boerne for an answer,9 RLPA's proponents again relied in part
on congressional powers to enforce constitutional rights under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Congress would do well, however, to
recall the counsel of the Court in Boerne:
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is
preserved best when each part of the government respects both
the Constitution and the proper actions and determinations of
85. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
86. 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that 20 U.S.C. § 158, which directed the secretary of
transportation to withhold five percent of federal highway funds otherwise due a state if that state
permitted the purchase or public possession of alcoholic beverages by any person under age 21,
neither violated the Twenty-First Amendment nor congressional authority under the spending
clause, where the Twenty-First Amendment merely banned direct federal regulation of drinking
ages and Congress had the authority to attach conditions to the states' receipt of federal funds).
87. Id. at 207-08.
88. See H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. § 2(a)(1), (2) (1999).
89. Md § 2(c).
90. Id. § 5(d)(1).
91. See supra note 36.
92. See H.R. RFP. No. 106-219, at 17-18, 24-25 (1999).
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the other branches. When the Court has interpreted the
Constitution, it has acted within the province of the Judicial
Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is
(emphasis supplied).93
Another area of potential problems for RLPA was its provision
specifically addressing land use regulation."' RLPA's proponents correctly
pointed out that (at least in general), "religions are practiced by
communities of believers," and the ability of communities to assemble for
worship is therefore a core element of the right of Free Exercise.95 They
asserted that many zoning regulations acted as obstacles to communities
of faith that wished to build or expand facilities. These included:
(1) regulations that limited church' construction to areas zoned
residential, creating practical and financial difficulties in obtaining
necessary space;
(2) regulations that required churches to obtain special use permits or
barred them from building or establishing themselves in areas zoned for
commercial activity;
(3) regulations that were so broadly and vaguely worded that they gave
local officials and boards excessive discretion, which too often included
the discretion to exercise their religious prejudices, particularly against
those who belong to minority religions."
The first two of these problems appear to be more of a function of
history, politics and fiscal policy than anti-religious bigotry. Many zoning
laws were written in an era when people attended churches immediately in
their neighborhoods, long before the automobile, cultural changes and
suburban sprawl facilitated the growth of "mega churches" (i.e., those with
tens of thousands of members) or metropolitan congregations (those that
draw the majority of their membership from outside of the areas in which
they are located). Historically, churches were often zoned into residential
areas to make it easier for people to walk to services and help
congregations to fulfill their roles as loci of community (and often ethnic
or racial) cohesion and social activity.
The financial motive for both the regulations limiting church construction
to residential areas and restricting or even prohibiting in areas zoned
commercial is very simple: churches do not pay property taxes, and many
smaller towns and suburbs are concerned that an influx of churches -
93. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (I Cranch.) 137, 177 (1803)).
94. See H.R. 1691 § 3(b).
95. H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 18.
96. Unless otherwise specified, the term "church" is used here generically and encompasses
mosques, temples, synagogues, and other houses of worship.
97. See H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 18-20.
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populated by people who live elsewhere - will drive down the property tax
revenues on which they rely to support their schools, provide police and fire
protection and other services. Such declines in revenues can force local
officials to choose between the politically unpalatable options of cutting
valued governmental services or raising property taxes. As these
considerations demonstrate, the challenges faced by churches that want to
build, expand or relocate in residential or commercial areas may be more
generally the result of zoning laws that have failed to catch up with
changing demographic and social patterns and political calculations than
with religious bigotry.
The third problem raised by RLPA's proponents - vaguely worded
regulations that give too much discretionary power to officials and bodies
that make zoning and similar decisions - is potentially more problematic.
They contend that the "virtually unlimited discretion" exercised by local
land use regulators creates a system of double standards which
discriminates against churches in general and creates particular difficulties
for minority religious groups, who may not have the financial resources to
afford protracted legal challenges to those decisions.9 In sum, the
problem is this: "land use regulation is commonly administered through
individualized processes not controlled by neutral and generally applicable
rules. The standards in individualized land use regulations are often vague,
discretionary and subjective.""
On that last point, it seems that RLPA's advocates overstated their case.
If, as they alleged, the problem is really a failure to have neutral and
generally applicable laws, then Smith does not apply and those who wish
to challenge such regulations on Free Exercise grounds are presumably free
to insist on application of the compelling interest/least restrictive means
test without relying on RLPA.
If the discretionary acts of land use regulators are really discriminatory
acts, there are already existing laws and precedents through which they
may be attacked. Where, as RLPA's supporters found, religious
discrimination may also be a surrogate for racial or ethnic
discrimination,"° it can be attacked on other grounds (e.g., equal
protection). Further, the Court has also addressed this issue in a case that
it decided several years ago, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah.' A review of this case demonstrates that it may also be
98. Id. at 20.
99. Id. at 24.
100. See id. at 23 n.111 (noting, inter alia, a witness' report of a case in which the mayor
instructed his city manager to deny a land use permit to a church because, "we don't want spics
in this town").
101. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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used to challenge land use regulations that may discriminate against
religious groups.
The case involved a community of practitioners of Santeria, a religion
which developed during the era of the slave trade in the Caribbean and
fuses elements of the religion of Yoruba people of West Africa and Roman
Catholicism."~ In 1987, the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye (church),
which was formed in 1973, leased land in Hialeah, a city located in south
Florida, and announced plans to build a place for worship, along with a
school, cultural center and museum, all designed to "bring the practice of
the Santeria faith, including the ritual of animal sacrifice, into the
open. '"
°1
The reaction by many people in Hialeah was swift and negative. It
prompted an emergency meeting of the city council and resulted in actions
ranging from the passage of a resolution that registered not only a
"concern" but also the intent of the city to ban "any and all acts of any
religious groups which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or
safety,"'" to a series of ordinances incorporating provisions of Florida
statutes prohibiting animal cruelty"rs and defining "sacrifice"'" and
"slaughter '' "w in manners clearly directed at Santeria practices that
members of the faith believed were absolutely essential."n
Faced with public hostility and the prospect of having their religious
practices subject to criminal prosecution, the church and its priest filed suit
in federal court, claiming, inter alia, that the actions of the city and its
officials violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the
102. See id. at 524 ("When thousands of members of the Yoruba people were brought as
slaves from Western Africa to Cuba, their traditional African religion absorbed significant
elements of Roman Catholicism. The resulting syncretion, or fusion, is Santeria, 'the way of the
saints.' The Cuban Yoruba express their devotion to spirits, called rishas, through the iconography
of the Catholic saints, Catholic symbols are often present at Santeria rites, and Santeria devotees
attend the Catholic sacraments .... The Santeria faith teaches that every individual has a destiny
from God, a destiny fulfilled with the aid and energy of the orisha. The basis of the Santeria
religion is the nurture of a person relation with the orishas, and one of the principal forms of
devotion is an animal sacrifice.").
103. Id. at 525, 526.
104. 1l at 526 (quoting Resolution 87-66).
105. See id. at 526-27 (citing and quoting provisions of FLA. STAT. ch. 828 (1987)).
106. See id. at 527-28 ("Ordinance 87-52 defined 'sacrifice' as 'to unnecessarily kill, torment,
torture or mutilate an animal in a public or private ceremony not for the primary purpose of food
consumption,' and prohibited owning or possession of an animal 'intending to use such animal
for food purposes.' . . . The ordinance contained an exemption for slaughtering by 'licensed
establishment[s]' of animals 'specifically raised for food purposes.'").
107. See id. at 528 ("The final ordinance, 87-72, defined 'slaughter' as 'the killing of animals
for food' and prohibited slaughter outside of areas zoned for slaughterhouse use.").
108. See id. at 525 ("According to Santeria teaching, the orishas are powerful but not
immortal. They depend for survival on the sacrifice.").
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Constitution." The district court ruled in favor of the defendants,
concluding that the effects of the ordinances on the church and its
members were merely "incidental to their secular purpose and effect.""
0
The Court found that the city's actions were justified by four compelling
interests: (1) prevention of a health risk; (2) avoidance of emotional trauma
to children who would witness the sacrifice; (3) prevention of animal
cruelty; and, (4) restriction of animal slaughter to designated areas. 1' In
a one-paragraph per curiam opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, reversed the lower
courts and found that "the challenged laws had an impermissible object;
and in all events the principle of general applicability was violated because
the secular ends asserted in defense of the laws were pursued only with
respect to conduct motivated by religious beliefs.""' Even if the laws at
issue were facially neutral insofar as terms such as "sacrifice" and "ritual"
had arguably secular as well as religious meanings, the Court maintained
that "the Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility
which is masked, as well as overt.""' It found that the various ordinances
constituted a "religious gerrymander," that is, they created burdens that
singularly fell on adherents to Santeria and their practices but exempted
others.""
The Court pointed out that, under Smith, when laws and regulations
represent a system of "individualized governmental assessment for the
reasons for the relevant conduct""' and allow for the granting of
individualized exemptions, governments may not refuse to grant such
exemptions for religiously motivated conduct in the absence of a compelling
109. See id. at 528.
110. Id. at 529 (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F.
Supp. 1467, 1484 (S.D. Fla. 1989)).
111. See id. at 529-30.
112. Id. at524.
113. Id. at 534.
114. See id. at 534-38. Regarding the city's incorporation of the Florida animal cruelty
statute, for example,
killings for religious reasons are deemed unnecessary, whereas most other killings
fall outside the prohibition. The city, on what seems to be a per se basis, deems
hunting, slaughter of animals for food, eradication of insects and pests, and
euthanasia as necessary .... Respondent's application of the ordinances test of
necessity devalues religious reasons for killing by judging them to be of lesser
import than nonreligious reasons .... Thus religious practice is being singled out
for discriminatory treatment.
Id. at 537-38.
115. 1d. at 537 (quoting Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 884 (1990)).
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interest. "6 In addition, governments may not, as the City of Hialeah did
with its "necessity" test regarding animal killings, prohibit conduct that is
religiously motivated while granting exemptions for that same conduct has
more secular motivations." 7
Interestingly, in testing whether the city's ordinances were neutral in their
objectives, the Court also utilized an equal protection form of analysis."'
The object of the laws could be determined from both direct and
circumstantial evidence, including: (1) the historical background of the
governmental decision at issue; (2) the chronology of events leading to that
decision; and, (3) the legislative or administrative history of the decision,
"including contemporaneous statements made by the members of the
decision-making body."'19 Utilizing such sources, the Court found ample
evidence of hostility toward the church and Santeria.',
The Court also found that the City of Hialeah ordinances not only failed
the neutrality test but were also not generally applicable because, as already
noted,"' they were underinclusive by failing to proscribe other, secularly
motivated forms of conduct that endangered their proffered governmental
interests." The Court concluded:
Where government restricts only conduct protected by the First
Amendment and fails to enact feasible measures to restrict other
conduct producing substantial harm or alleged harm of the same
sort, the interest given in justification of the restriction is not
compelling."
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye provides plaintiffs wishing to
challenge land use regulations on Free Exercise grounds a useful framework
by which to litigate their claims. The House Judiciary Committee's report
supporting RLPA, for example, noted:
[an] attorney specializing in land use litigation testified that it
is not uncommon for ordinances to establish standards for
houses of worship differing from those applicable to other
116. See id.
117. See id
118. See id at 540 (citing use of such analysis in the Establishment Clause context in Walz
v. Tax Comn'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
119. See id. (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,266,
267-68 (1977)).
120. See id at 541. For example, at a meeting of the Hialeah city council, the body's
president openly asked, "What can we do to prevent the church from opening?" The chaplain of
the police department referred to Santeria as "foolishness," "an abomination to the Lord," and a
form of demon worship.
121. See supra note 114.
122. See Church of the Laumui Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 536-38.
123. Id at 54647.
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places of assembly, such as (whether there) are conditional uses
or not permitted in any zone .... [A survey showed that] uses
such as banquet halls, clubs, community centers, funeral parlors,
fraternal organizations, health clubs, gyms, places of
amusement, recreation centers, lodges, libraries, museums,
municipal buildings, meeting halls, and theaters are often
permitted as of right where churches require a special use
permit, or permitted on special use permit where churches are
wholly excluded."u
Where double standards exist, churches can challenge such ordinances
and the consequent decisions of bodies regulating land use by asserting the
secular objects of such regulations fail to meet Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye's standards of not merely facial but practical neutrality and
general applicability under an equal protection analysis. For example, if a
zoning board claims that churches are denied special use permits to locate
in particular areas because it has a compelling interest in preserving the
local tax base but it maintains a practice of granting such permits to other
tax-exempt organizations (e.g., charitable organizations), such disparate
treatment could be successfully challenged, particularly if there is evidence
of animus toward churches in general, toward a particular denomination or
church,"= or because of its racial or ethnic makeup."
Despite what even its detractors concede is not only a worthy goal but
an imperative in the fight for the preservation of religious liberty against the
coercive powers of government,"m RLPA was not the means by which that
end was likely to be achieved. Had RLPA become law, it was likely to face
serious constitutional challenges and ultimately the same fate as its infirm
predecessor, RFRA. It may not have been necessary to overcome the very
124. H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 19, 20 (1999).
125. See, e.g., id. at 23 ("The subcommittee [on the Constitution] also received testimony
of overt religious bigotry in zoning hearings. One witness described a hearing in which 'an
objector turned to the people in the audience wearing skull caps and said, 'Hitler should have
killed more of you .... ' Another witness discussed a case involving the application for a permit
by the Family Christian Center, where a neighbor implored, 'Let's keep these god-damned
Pentecostals out of here.'").
126. See, e.g., id. at 23 n. 111 ("Wayne, New Jersey denied a permit to a black church, after
one official opposed the permit on the ground that the city would soon look like Patterson, a
predominately African-American city nearby. . . Clifton, New Jersey denied permits for a black
mosque four times, offering parking concerns as the reason, then approved a white church nearby
that raised the very same parking issues.").
127. See id. at 40 ("Legislation restoring [the compelling interest/least restrictive means test
and] this appropriate balance between the rights of individuals and minority religions, including
the religions of racial and ethnic minorities with different beliefs, on the one hand, and the
prerogatives of the majority on the other, should remain at the top of the legislative agenda.").
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problems it purported to address. Ultimately, it may have complicated and
hindered, rather than vindicated, Free Exercise claims.
V. Making Free Exercise Claims in the Shadows of Smith and Boerne
Despite Smith, the proscription of RFRA and the likely demise of RLPA
(had it been enacted), Native Americans still have several options available
for asserting and having courts sustain claims against governmental conduct
that substantially burdens their right to free exercise of their religion. They
may still assert constitutional claims under certain circumstances, rely on
statutory protections, and also use their growing political power to influence
legislative bodies to more fully accommodate their religious practices.
Just as one can lament the Court's holding in Smith as "a wholesale
overturning of settled law concerning the Religion Clauses of our
Constitution"" or as "a product of the overreaction to the serious
problems the country's drug crisis has generated,"'" one also can note the
limits of the decision. Smith applies only in cases involving the enforcement
of neutral laws of general applicability.'"
As the Court demonstrated in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah,'3' laws that evince not only an effect but also an intent
to discriminate against religious practices can still be successfully
challenged on Free Exercise grounds. Establishing such intent, of course,
can be a considerable challenge. To do so demands a thorough examination
of the statutory language, legislative history, and other background of the
enactment at issue.
In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, the petitioners were able to point
to the challenged ordinance's use of the words "sacrifice" and "ritual" as
suggesting that it was drafted to proscribe particular religious practices and
not particular conduct irrespective of its (lack of) religious purpose." The
Court found that, while this evidence was not in itself dispositive but merely
probative, it buttressed other evidence of intentional discrimination on the
record, including other ordinances providing exceptions for other religious
groups engaging in essentially the same conduct the ordinance at issue
128. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 908 (1990)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
129. Id.
130. Ld. at 874 ("This case requires us to decide whether the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment permits the State of Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use within
the reach of its general criminal prohibition on the use of that drug, and thus permits the state
to deny unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs because of religiously
inspired use." (emphasis supplied)).
131. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
132. Id at 534.
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sought to proscribe, as well as manifestations of public hostility against
Santeria and its adherents at public hearings.
One of the notable aspects of the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye case
was the role that prejudice and other forms of ignorance played in the
disparate treatment of the devotees of a minority religion. American Indians
who practice the native religions of their ancestors face a similar lack of
appreciation, if not outright hostility. This is evident, for example, in the
area of land use regulation. While the belief in a sacred place and the
practice of pilgrimage is common to many religions, 33 Native Americans
have the distinction - and the curse - of having all of their sacred sites
located in U.S. territory and thus subject to domestic land regulations. In
addition, as Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Lyng:
A pervasive feature of [the Native American] lifestyle is the
individual's relationship with the natural world . . . . Tribal
religions regard creation as an ongoing process in which they
are morally and religiously obligated to participate .... Where
dogma lies at the heart of Western religions, Native American
faith is inextricably bound to the use of the land. The site-
specific nature of Indian religious practice derives from the
Native American perception that the land is itself a sacred,
living being (emphasis supplied)."
Courts considering the Free Exercise claims of Native Americans and
other religious minority litigants should pay heed to the example set out in
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, and carefully evaluate their practices to
discern whether facially neutral laws are really neutral in practice. They
should examine whether the general applicability and, if relevant, the failure
of those laws to grant exemptions for religious practice are founded more
on ignorance than on justice.
While Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye holds out some hope for
religious minorities whose practices are limited by governmental action, it
will not be a panacea. A brief survey of relatively recent case law reveals
that the bulk of Native American Free Exercise claims have involved at
least facially neutral laws and regulations of general applicability that have,
nevertheless, had a disparate impact on their religious practices. These
Smith-class cases include disputes over land use,'35 prison grooming and
133. Examples of such customs include the Roman Catholic pilgrimages to Rome, Lourdes,
Jerusalem, etc., or the hajj to Mecca - one of the five pillars of Islamic observance.
134. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 460-61 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
135. See, e.g., ihi; see also Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983); Badoni v.
Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that federal land management policies and
practices in Rainbow Bridge National Monument area and Glen Canyon Dam and Reservoir areas
did not violate rights to free exercise of Indian claimants, who alleged, inter alia, that those
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dress regulations," and welfare regulations.3 " This survey, and a
consideration of five of the cases following it, illustrate the sobering reality
that the First Amendment claims of Native Americans have not been
accorded great deference in either the pre- or post-Smith periods. In truth,
there has never really been a "golden era" of Native American religious
liberty.
Case (Year) Challenged Law/Regulation Prevailing Party
Top Sky (1976)'" species protection government
Sequoyah (19 80)9 land, water use government
Badoni (1980)'" land use government
Wilson (1983)"' land use government
Crow (1983) 12 land use government
Means (1985)14 land use Native Americans
Standing Deer (1987)'" prison (dress) government
Lyng (1987)"'4 land use government
Smith (1990)" criminal (drugs) government
Iron Eyes v. Henry (1990)" '  prison (grooming) government
Native Village of Tanana (1991)'" land use (hunting) government
policies resulted in the drowning of their gods and denial of access to their sacred places).
136. See, e.g., Iron Eyes v. Henry, 907 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1990); see also Standing Deer v.
Carlson, 831 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir. 1987).
137. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
138. United States v. Top Sky, 547 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1976).
139. Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980) (affirming
dismissal of suit brought by Cherokee Indians to enjoin impoundment of reservoir, against the
tribe's claim that the land to be flooded was sacred to their religion, where the tribe failed to
produce evidence that the land at issue was central or indispensable to their religious practices).
140. Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980) (affirming summary judgment for
defendants in suit brought by individual Indians and tribal groups, against their claim that
impounding water to form Lake Powell and allowing tourists to visit the Rainbow Bridge
National Monument violated their rights to free exercise).
141. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that U.S. Forest Service
decision permitting private interests to develop and expand government-owned ski area in the San
Francisco Peaks in the Coconino National Forest did not violate rights of Navajo and Hopi tribes
under the First Amendment or the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, where they retained
access to the peaks and the ability to conduct ceremonies and gather sacred objects).
142. Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983).
143. United States v. Means, 627 F. Supp. 247 (W.D. S.D. 1985) (ordering federal
government to issue special use permit allowing indians to use portion of Black Hills for religious
camp where govemmental decision initially denying the permit was arbitrary and capricious and
burdened their rights to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment).
144. Standing Deer v. Carlson, 831 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir. 1987).
145. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
146. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
147. Iron Eyes v. Henry, 907 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1990).
148. Native Village of Tanana v. Cowper, 945 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding Alaska
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Case (Year) Challenged Law/Regulation Prevailing Party
Hamilton (1996)"' prison (grooming) government
Hugs (1997)"'I  species protection government
Miccosukee Tribe (1997)' land/water use government
Kickapoo Traditional Tribe (1999) 52 public health (autopsy) government
At the outset of this analysis, it must be conceded that not every Free
Exercise claim is legitimate. In United States v. Top Sky,"' for example, a
father and son who were members of the Chippewa-Cree Tribe appealed their
convictions for violating provisions of the Bald Eagle Protection Act' for
selling eagle parts and feathers to undercover federal officers posing as agents
for East Coast collectors.' " Among the grounds for their appeal was the
claim that the act unconstitutionally burdened their free exercise of religion,
with the son maintaining that such exchanges among Indians were not
considered commercial in nature but rather were part of their religious
practices."
The Court, however, found that since the laws were criminal in nature and
thus generally applicable, the commercial sale of eagle feathers was in fact
condemned by the Native American church, and the government had
established a permit system to provide exemptions for the use of eagle
feathers and parts for religious use, the appellants had no standing to assert
their Free Exercise claims.'" While the right to religious liberty is precious,
it cannot serve as a cover for criminal activity.
It is quite safe to state, however, that bogus religious claims like those
proffered in Top Sky are the exception rather than the rule. In most cases, the
hunting regulations restricting killing of moose out of season against claim of Tanana chiefs that,
inter alia, the regulations violated their Free Exercise rights).
149. Hamilton v. Schiro, 74 F.3d 1545 (8th Cir. 1996) (reversing district court injunction and
upholding prison regulations that limited Indian inmate's hair length and denied him access to
sweat lodge against his claim that such actions violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause
and RFRA).
150. United States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming convictions of Native
American defendants for violations of the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act against their
claims that, inter alia, the act violated their Free Exercise rights under the First Amendment and
RFRA, where the act was the least restrictive means of serving a compelling governmental
interest).
151. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 980 F. Supp. 448 (S.D. Fla. 1997)
(holding that alleged refusal of Army Corps of Engineers and various federal agencies to alleviate
flooding on three parcels of land belonging to Miccosukee Tribe did not, inter alia, infringe its
right to free exercise of religion).
152. Kickapoo Traditional Tribe v. Chacon, 46 F. Supp. 2d 644 (W.D. Tex. 1999).
153. 547 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1976).
154. See 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1994).
155. See Top Sky, 547 F.2d at 484.
156. See id. at 485.
157. See id. at 484, 485, 488.
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religious claims of Native Americans are far more serious, often contrasting
the religious interests and understandings of the majority with those of
minorities.
In Crow v. Gullet' the competing interests at issue were the recreational
aspirations of the general public and the religious devotions of members of
the Lakota and Tsistsistas Nations. A geological formation that was a
traditional religious site for the tribes had been purchased by the State of
South Dakota and developed into a park and campground with appurtenant
roads, parking lots, machine shop and walkways. The state required all
visitors to purchase a permit in order to camp, but it gave those camping for
ceremonial reasons a free ten-day permit."
The tribes brought suit in federal court, claiming that the development and
regulated use of the park violated their rights not only under the Free Exercise
Clause but also under the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978
(AIRFA)261 as well as provisions of international law." They claimed that
the actions of the state and its officers, as well as the resultant development
and recreational traffic, diminished the spiritual value of their ceremonial site
and thus impeded their ability to perform their religious rites without
disruption."rt
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
decision of the district court granting the defendants' motion for summary
judgment.'" The Eighth Circuit held that the tribes' Free Exercise interests
were "outweighed by compelling state interests in preserving the environment
and the resource from further decay and erosion, in protecting the health,
safety and welfare of park visitors and in improving public access to this
unique geological and historical landmark [Bear Butte]."'' It also found that
158. 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983).
159. See i. at 857.
160. See id.
161. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994).
162. See Crow, 706 F.2d at 857. The court cited the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
U.N.G.A. Res. 217, art. 18 (Dec. 10, 1948) ("Everyone has the freedom of thought conscience
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone
or in community with other and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship and observance.") and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 18 (Dec. 16, 1966) (ratified by U.S., June 8, 1992) ("(1) [incorporates art.
18 of the universal declaration verbatim]. (2) No one shall be subject to coercion which would
impair his freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of his choice. (3) Freedom to manifest
one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms
of others. (4) The states parties to this covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of
parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their
children in conformity with their own convictions.").
163. See Crow, 706 F.2d at 858.
164. See id. at 858-59.
165. Id. at 858.
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the tribes' statutory and international law claims "did not establish any legal
rights or causes of action beyond the First Amendment."'"
Crow v. Gullet demonstrates that the mere application of a compelling
interest test does not necessarily mean an increased likelihood of vindication
for Native American Free Exercise claimants. It also reveals the limitations
of using international declarations and treaties; in practice, they function at
best as secondary authority. It should be noted that, at the time Crow was
litigated, one of the treaties upon which the plaintiffs relied had not yet been
ratified. When it finally was, it contained reservations and conditions that
essentially affirmed the courts' decisions about the limitation on causes of
action."
If the prospects of success for Indian Free Exercise claimants are daunting
in the free world, the two cases that follow reveal that they are even more so
in the bowels of the corrections system. In Standing Deer v. Carlson," a
group of Indian inmates at a federal prison in California challenged
regulations that banned them from wearing headgear, including religious
headbands, in the prison dining room." They claimed that the regulations
violated their rights under the First Amendment and AIRFA by: (1) forcing
them to take off their headbands, which they claimed were articles of clothing
of religious significance; (2) not providing an exception for such religious use;
and, (3) not consulting with them prior to the implementation of a policy that
would have a negative impact on their religious practices."
Prison officials defended their actions by asserting that they were necessary
to maintain prison discipline, to address inmate complaints about unsanitary
conditions in the dining room, and to avoid potentially dangerous
confrontations over dirty headbands or the inspections required to ensure that
they were free of contraband."" They also noted that, since its
implementation, the regulation had been uniformly enforced."n
In affirming the trial court's decision to grant the defendants' motion for
summary judgment, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
found that neither the First Amendment nor AIRFA were violated by the
prison regulation. The court applied the rational basis test articulated by the
Supreme Court of the United States in OLone v. Estate of Shabazz: "[w]hen
166. Id.
167. See supra note 162; see also U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to
Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REC. S4781
(1991) (conditioning the Senate's advice and consent subject on a proviso that, "nothing in this
covenant requires or authorizes legislation, or other action, by the United States of America
prohibited by the constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States").
168. 831 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir. 1987).
169. See id. at 1526.
170. See id at 1527.
171. See id.
172. See iL at 1526-27.
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a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation
is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."'7 The
court cited several factors used to determine whether a challenged regulation
satisfied the test:
(1) whether the regulation had a logical connection to the
penological interests invoked to justify it;
(2) whether the prisoners remained free to participate in other
religious activities;
(3) whether accommodating the prisoners' asserted rights would
have adverse affects on the institution; and
(4) whether ready alternatives that fully accommodated the
prisoners' rights could be implemented with a de minimis impact
on valid penological interests.'
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the reasons of safety, discipline, and
order proffered by prison officials satisfied the first three of these factors."'
It also found that the inmate-plaintiffs failed to point to "an obvious, easy
alternative" that would satisfy the last factor.7 As in Crow, the court also
found that AIRFA did not provide the plaintiffs with a cause of action."
In addition, the statute did not require prison officials to consult with Indian
inmates before drafting or implementing regulations that might have an
adverse impact on their religious practices; rather, it merely directed them "to
familiarize themselves with Native American religious values in order to avoid
unwarranted and unintended interference with traditional native religious
practices."' 7
The other prison case considered here, Iron Eyes v. Henry,' generally
followed the same pattern and disposition as Standing Deer. Iron Eyes,
however, has some distinctive and disturbing elements that deserve additional
consideration. The case involved a member of the Standing Rock Tribe of
Sioux, who, while serving time in a Missouri facility, challenged prison
grooming regulations that required "prisoners to wear their hair above their
shirt collars."" Pursuant to that regulation, prison officials twice cut his
hair, once while he was shackled and handcuffed in disciplinary segregation
for refusing to comply.''
173. Id. at 1528 (quoting O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987)).
174. Id. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987)).
175. See id. at 1528-29.
176. See id. at 1529.
177. See id. at 1529-30.
178. Id.
179. 907 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1990).
180. See id. at 811.
181. See i at 811-12.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2000
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
Iron Eyes claimed that haircuts - which he had had only five times in
twenty-seven years (including the two times in prison) - violated a
traditional practice of his religion by compelling him to commit an offense
against the Creator and thus violated his right to free exercise under the First
Amendment.' In affirming the lower court's decision granting the
defendants' motion for summary judgment, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit found that the grooming regulations were neutral and
rationally related to legitimate penological objectives: the preservation of
prison discipline; administrative efficiency; the prevention of the smuggling
of contraband; and, the facilitation of prisoner identification."
While the result in Iron Eyes may not be remarkable, some of the facts of
the case bear further exposition. Missouri prison regulations did provide for
an exemption from the grooming regulations for Native Americans, and Iron
Eyes had applied for it but was denied.'" The Eighth Circuit majority noted
that two other Native American inmates at the same facility had applied for
the exemption and, like Iron Eyes, their claims were denied."L As the
dissent pointed out, no prisoner at that facility had ever been granted the
exemption."
What was more striking about this case was both the district and the
appellate courts' apparent disregard for indications in the record that Iron Eyes
was far more than a victim of a neutral and generally applicable regulation.
The plaintiffs pro se complaint set forth allegations of rank prejudice against
him because of his heritage and religion:
I tried to explain to Maj. Harris that I am a full-blooded Native
American Indian and Maj. Harris told me that I was not an Indian
as there are no Indians in his prison and that I was really a white
boy trying to get over on him .... Well, Dan Henry (assistant
superintendent), Maj. Harris, and Capt. Rosenburg and the guards
all took my leg shackles and handcuffs real hard and held me
down and this inmate barber named Earl Wells came over and cut
my hair into a raggedy mess. that is when they all started
laughing and Maj. Harris said that now I could get some white
religion .... I have filed many grievances about it but they tell
me that I am not a nigger and that if I was I could have anything
I want from the place because of the court2'
182. See id at 811.
183. See id. at 814-16.
184. See id. at 812.
185. See id. at 816.
186. See id.
187. Id.
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It appears from Iron Eyes that the courts defined "neutrality" in extremely
broad terms.
The most recent of the cases considered here, Kickapoo Traditional Tribe
v. Chacon,Iu concerned a law that fits a much more conventional definition
of neutrality. Like all the other governmental actions considered here, it was
upheld against the Free Exercise claims of Native American plaintiffs. The
issue was whether the tribe could, on Free Exercise grounds, enjoin the State
of Texas and Martha Chacon, a justice of the peace, from disinterring the
body of a tribal member in order to conduct an autopsy.'"
The case arose from the sudden death of Norma Rodriguez in Eagle Pass,
Texas. When Chacon arrived at the scene of the death, the sheriff's deputies
informed her Rodriguez was a known abuser of inhalants; they suspected that
she died from spray paint poisoning." Meanwhile, the victim's grieving
mother claimed that somebody killed her daughter.' Faced with a lack of
solid evidence to support either scenario, Chacon requested an autopsy."
Almost immediately, however, she was besieged with calls from tribal
members opposing the procedure; and the tribe's chief instructed the funeral
director in charge of the body that no such procedure was to be
performed.'
After another meeting with the mother of the victim - who did not oppose
the autopsy and continued to insist that her daughter was murdered - as well
as members of the tribe who proffered alleged evidence that the victim had
indeed died of paint poisoning, Chacon remained convinced of the need for
an autopsy. She persisted in seeking to obtain it even after a call from the
tribe's attorney explaining why the tribe's religious beliefs did not permit
it.'" Before the procedure could be performed, however, tribal members
took the body of the victim from the funeral home and buried it on tribal
land.9
Chacon then ordered that the body of the victim be exhumed and the
autopsy performed, but the tribe filed suit to prevent those actions and
obtained a temporary restraining order from a state court to that effect.'
The tribe claimed that permitting the exhumation and autopsy would violate
both their Free Exercise rights, as well as the Native Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act (NAGPRA).' Because of the federal questions involved,
188. 46 F. Supp. 2d 644 (W.D. Tex. 1999).
189. See id. at 645.
190. See id. at 646.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 646-47.
194. See id. at 647.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. Id.; see Native Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-601,
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the state removed the action to federal court, seeking an order vacating the
temporary restraining order.19
The court granted the defendants' motion and vacated the temporary
injunction, thus permitting the disinterment and autopsy to go forward. The
court rejected the tribe's NAGPRA claims, finding that the law "was not
meant to apply to a recently buried corpse which is of no particular cultural
or anthropological interest 1"" and was "inapplicable to a recently buried
corpse that state authorities seek to exhume to determine the cause of death
in connection with an inquest.""an
The court was similarly not persuaded by the tribe's claim that permitting
these procedures would interfere with their deeply held religious beliefs and
practices and thus violate the Free Exercise Clause. 0 After acknowledging
the invalidation of RFRA vis-h-vis the actions of states in Boerne and
applying the Smith test, 2 the court concluded that the state law permitting
justices of the peace to order inquests, exhumations and autopsies" was a
neutral law of general applicability and, absent any evidence that Chacon's
actions were motivated by anti-religious bias, did not violated the First
Amendment.'
While the result of Kickapoo Traditional Tribe may be unremarkable in
light of other courts' treatments of Native American Free Exercise claims, the
court's opinion does contain a coda that is notable for its depth of sensitivity.
Judge Garcia wrote:
A history of recognition of and respect for Native American
burial traditions sadly does not exist in this country. Instead, the
development of our nation's laws regarding the handling and
burial of the dead have reflected the Anglican customs and
practices imported from England, the source of our common law,
and not those of other cultures .... These laws are often drafted
to provide little or no flexibility to accommodate the diverse
104 Stat. 3048 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (1994)).
198. See Kickapoo Traditional Tribe, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 648.
199. lt at 650.
200. ld. at 651.
201. See id. ("[lit is the tribe's practice to bury deceased members before noon of the day
following death. It is also the tribe's belief that the scarring of the body caused by an autopsy and
the disruption of a grave damages the spirit and can have an adverse effect on the decedent's
family.").
202. See id at 653.
203. Id.; see TEx. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 49, subch. a (Vernon Supp. 1999).
204. See id at 654 ("In these circumstances, the court must conclude that article 49, on its
face and in its implementation in this case, is a facially neutral law of general application. While
it substantially impacts the tribe's First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, that impact
does not rise to the level of a First Amendment violation.").
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traditions of persons adhering to Native American, Orthodox Jew,
Hmong or other religions.'
In noting that other states had drafted laws requiring officials to consider
the views of relatives in weighing the necessity of an autopsy, Judge Garcia
suggested that "Texas, with its large and culturally diverse population, might
consider enacting a similar statute."' However, he conceded that such a
decision was "within the complete discretion of the state legislature."'
Faced with the limited potential of successfully litigating attacks on facially
neutral and generally applicable laws that evince a legitimate governmental
objective but have the effect of limiting their ability to freely exercise their
native religions, American Indian claimants have sometimes found that they
can better preserve those interests through legislation. Indeed, in noting
exemptions for sacramental peyote use in statutes otherwise criminalizing the
use of the drug, the Court in Smith, perhaps with an air of hope, suggested
that "a society that believes in the negative protection afforded to religious
belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as
well."'  In criticizing the "counsels of doom" by religious critics of the
Smith decision, Professor Steven Goldberg noted:
The truly remarkable thing about Smith is that after it was
decided, the democratically elected Oregon Legislature showed
more sympathy than the court had to religious practice. Although
Native Americans make up a small percentage of the voters in
Oregon, the legislature created an exception from its ban on
peyote use for use in religious rituals, thus joining many states
and the federal government, which had done exactly the same
thing.'
As Professor Goldberg's analysis suggests, there is some evidence that
legislatures will, if sufficiently educated and sensitized, create laws that will
be sensitive to the Free Exercise claims and spiritual needs of Indians who
practice their native religions. An example of such responsiveness is
NAGPRA, which was cited in Kickapoo Traditional Tribe.2 " In general, the
act:
205. I.
206. id. at 654-55.
207. Id. at 655.
208. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990)
(citing statutes in Arizona, Colorado and New Mexico excepting sacramental peyote use from the
application of generally applicable drug laws).
209. GOLDBERo, supra note 26, at 81-82 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(5) (1995); Smith,
494 U.S. at 906 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment and noting, inter alia, the federal
exception for sacramental peyote use in 42 U.S.C. § 1996a).
210. See 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 3001-3013 (West Supp. 1999).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2000
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
prohibits trade, transport or sale of Native American human
remains and directs federal agencies and museums to take
inventory of any Native American or Native Hawaiian remains,
and if identifiable, the agency is to return them to the tribal
descendants .... The act prohibits remains and objects from
being considered archeological resources, prohibits disturbing sites
without tribal consent, and imposes penalties for unauthorized
excavation, removal, damage or destruction.21'
Although a federal court in upholding the constitutionality of NAGPRA
and Indian claims pursuant to its provisions has acknowledged the statute's
explicit interest in preserving the "cultural patrimony,"2 '2 it is significant that
the statute also explicitly protects "funery objects" and "sacred objects. '213
These statutory provisions suggest a realization of something else about
Native American religion that is not always apparent to legislators or judges
from other cultures, particularly those that have more "mainstream" religious
affiliations and/or have become more assimilated into an increasingly
secularized American culture.
Much Indian religious life does not include the existence of a
church, periodic meetings, ritual, and identifiable dogma. Instead,
there is a pervasive quality to Indian religion which gives all
aspects of Indian life and society a spiritual significance. In
pursuit of traditional Indian religion, an Indian may feel
compelled to relate to nature and to others in a particular way.
Judicial understanding and protection of Indian religion are
hindered by a general unfamiliarity with Indian spiritual life, and
perhaps even intolerance for religious beliefs and practices not
succinctly defined by ancient writings or a central authority
familiar to european developed religious traditions."'
At a time when the vindication of the free exercise rights of Native
Americans may increasingly fall on legislative rather than judicial shoulders,
it is also important to remember that mere claims of sensitivity and good
intentions are insufficient to protect those rights. A case in point is the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978.2" AIRFA declares that it
211. GETcHES Er AL., supra note 13, at 788-89.
212. See United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1133
(1997) (upholding conviction of appellant under NAGPRA for transporting yei b'chei ceremonial
adornments against his claim that the statute was unconstitutionally vague).
213. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 3002(a)(l), (2) (1994) (providing that the "ownership or control of
native american cultural items excavated or discovered on federal or tribal lands after november
16, 1990" be in the lineal descendants or, generally, the tribe).
214. GmrCHEs ET AL., supra note 13, at 779.
215. Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994)).
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shall be federal policy "to protect and preserve for American Indians their
inherent right of freedom to believe, express and exercise the traditional
religions ... including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession
of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and
traditional rites. '
As was demonstrated in Crow v. Gullet,"17 however, the act is little more
than a congressional expression of noblesse oblige. It requires no more than
general compliance with the requirements of the First Amendment."' It
gives Native Americans no additional rights"' and does not provide them
with a cause of action.
In the Court's opinion in Lyng, Justice O'Connor found that the act's
ultimate impotence was not merely a matter of judicial interpretation but of
legislative intent:
Nowhere in the law is there so much as a hint of any intent to
create a cause of action or any judicially enforceable right. What
is obvious from the face of the statute is confirmed by numerous
indications in the legislative history. The sponsor of the bill that
became AIRFA, Representative Udall called it "a Sense of
Congress Joint Resolution," aimed at ensuring that "the basic right
of the Indian people to exercise their traditional religious practices
is not infringed without a clear decision on the part of Congress
or the administrators that such religious practices must yield to
some higher considerations." Representative Udall emphasized
that the bill would not "confer special religious rights on Indians,"
would "not change any existing state or federal law," and in fact
"has no teeth in it."'' 2
Unfortunately, what the preceding pages suggest is that in practice the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment has too often proved to be similarly
toothless when it comes to protecting the religious freedom of Native
Americans.
216. Id, 92 Stat. at 469.
217. 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983).
218. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1996 note of decision I (West 1994) (stating that "[t]his section
requires no more than compliance with dictates of the Freedom of Religion clause of" the First
Amendment) (citing Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (1982)).
219. See id. § 1997 note of decision 2 ("American Indian Religious Freedom Act was meant
to insure that American Indians were given protection guaranteed under First Amendment and
was not intended to grant them rights in excess of those guarantees.") (citing Attakai v. United
States, 746 F. Supp. 1395 (D. Ariz. 1990)).
220. See id. § 1996 note of decision 4 (citing Lockhart v. Kenops, 927 F.2d 1028 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 186 (1991). and Manybeads v. United States, 730 F. Supp. 1515 (D. Ariz.
1989)).
221. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 455 (1988)
(quoting 124 CONG. REc. 21444, 21444-21445 (1978)).
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VI. Conclusion
As the Revolutionary War neared its conclusion and the British were
abandoning their efforts to hold on to their soon-to-be former colonies,
American commissioners rode into villages in the country of the Shawnee
Indians and declared them conquered subjects. In response to this declaration,
a Shawnee reportedly replied, "God gave us this country ... it is all ours," but
he was essentially ignored.' Historian Thomas Fleming notes that
this attitude led to another series of bloody encounters - until the
Congress recommended in 1787 that its representatives drop their
"language of superiority and command" and deal with the Indians
"more on a footing of equality." Thereafter the American
government attempted to follow this policy. But the tidal wave of
Americans moving westward had no enthusiasm for it. Again and
again the settlers' hunger for land rendered treaties null and void.
In their view the Indians had joined the wrong side in the
Revolution, and they had no right to equal treatment.2m
This survey of the judicial and legislative treatment of the Free Exercise
interests of Native Americans raises the question of whether, after two centuries,
we as a nation have really shed this prejudice not merely in sentiment but in
practice. That Smith may not have dealt a devastating blow to the ability of
American Indians to freely practice their native religious beliefs is due more to
the general disrespect that has been accorded those beliefs than to the import of
that particular case. The potential help that the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act may have provided to vindicate the religious rights of American Indians
was significantly limited by Boerne, and the Religious Liberty Protection Act
was not likely to pass constitutional muster if it ever became law. Legislation
presents a potential avenue for buttressing the Free Exercise interests of Native
Americans, but as the American Indian Religious Freedom Act shows, that path
is also likely to prove rough and narrow.
The late Justice Blackmun passionately argued in his Smith dissent: "I do not
believe that the Founders thought their dearly bought freedom from religious
persecution a "luxury," but an essential element of liberty - and they could not
have thought religious intolerance "unavoidable," for they drafted the religion
clauses precisely in order to avoid that intolerance."' What the Founders
intended in crafting the first amendment is certainly a critical element in
discerning the scope and extent of religious liberty in the United States. Just as
important, however, is an even more fundamental question, one which confronts
222. See THOMAS FLEMING, LIBERTY! THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 294 (1997).
223. Ma.
224. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 909 (1990).
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us as truly today as it confronted them over two centuries ago: who, and whose
interests, will be enfolded in that protective embrace?
Addendum
On September 22, 2000, President Clinton signed into law the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). Like the
Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPA) analyzed in this article, a central
purpose of RLUIPA is to restore the use of the compelling interest/least
restrictive means test as the standard for challenging state and local
governmental land use regulation that substantially burdens religious
exercisetm  even where that burden arises from laws of general
applicability.m It also does the same for persons residing in or confined to
institutions, including prisons.'m As with RLPA, Congress has substantially
rested the applicability of this new law in the Commerce Clause.2
The legislative history of RLUIPA is notable for the remarkable swiftness
with which it moved from its introduction in the Senate to its enactment: about
ten weeks.' In introducing the bill for consideration in the House of
Representatives, Rep. Charles Canady (R.-Fla.) said: "The legislation uses the
recognized constitutional authority of the Congress to protect one of the most
fundamental aspects of religious freedom, the right to gather and worship, and
to protect the religious exercise of a class of people particularly vulnerable to
governmental regulation, and that is institutionalized persons.""'
Given the defects of RLPA already noted in this article and the precedents
established by the Supreme Court of the United States in cases like Employment
Division v. Smith, City of Boerne v. Flores, and OLone v. Estate of Shabazz, it
remains to be seen whether RLUIPA will be able to withstand constitutional
challenge, deliver on Congress' aspirations, and become an effective weapon for
American Indians and others to vindicate their rights guaranteed under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
225. Pub. L. No. 106-274 (2000).
226. See id. § 2(a).
227. See id. § 2(a)(2)(A), (B).
228. See id. § 3.
229. See id. §§ 2(aX2)(b), 3(b)(2).
230. See Bill Summary & Status for the 106th Congress, S. 2869 <http://thomasloc.govlcgi-
billlbdquery/zd106:SN02869:@ @@X (visited Oct. 7,2000) (noting that the bill was introduced
in the Senate on July 13 and was signed by the President on September 22, 2000).
231. 146 CONG. REc. H7190-91 (July 27, 2000).
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